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his case was best expressed by an Illinois appellate tribunal6 9 when it
stated:
While with reference to diseases in the human body, only men
versed in the science of surgery or medicine are qualified to pass
judgment on treatment given in a particular case, it does not need
the aid of expert testimony for any intelligent person to form an
opinion as to the impropriety of leaving a foreign object in a
wound.
Thus, when the standard of care required of the physician is obvious
to the average juror, a non-expert, lay witness can testify. The most frequent
type of case which the court would hold that a lay witness can be used to
testify to the standard of care required is when there is an external injury
70
observable by anyone.
When a more complicated issue on the standard of care required is
involved, the standard must be established by an expert-physician. However, in case of gross negligence, the departure from such standard may be
shown by the testimony of a lay witness. Once the expert has established
what the standard should have been, the lay witness may tell what actually
transpired, that is, what techniques the defendant did use. The jury may
then ascertain whether the conduct described by the lay witness was at
variance with what the expert declared ought to have been done.71
HOWARD M. HOFFMANN
GERALD J. SMOLLER

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A DEFENSE IN MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION
The gist of an action against a physician or surgeon for malpractice
is usually negligence rather than breach of contract.1 Thus, in Illinois, the
plaintiff must allege in his complaint that he was in the exercise of due care
or was free from contributory negligence at the time of the injury. 2 Once
the issue of contributory negligence has been raised by the pleadings, the
plaintiff has the burden of proving that he was in the exercise of due care
3
at the time.
69
70

Supra note 66.
Richisen v. Nann, 340 P.2d 793 (Wash. 1959). See also, Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 637

(1962).
71

See Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 637 (1962).

1 26 I.L.P. Medicine and Surgery § 36 (1956); 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 57
(1951). A charge of negligence is grounded on a failure to use due care. However, arising
out of the doctor-patient relationship is a contractual duty, express or implied, to use due
care; thus a breach of contract.
2 Ibid.
3 Mcllvain v. Gaele, 128 Ill. App. 209 (4th Dist. 1906).
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The conduct 4 alleged to constitute contributory negligence 5 may occur
during any of three time periods. The plaintiff's acts may occur prior to,
contemporaneous with or after the negligent conduct of the physician.
BEFORE TREATMENT

A patient's conduct prior to treatment cannot constitute the contributory negligence which relieves a physician or surgeon from liability for malpractice. The reasons supporting this result are grounded in the very concept of contributory negligence. Most courts explain the defense of contributory negligence in terms of proximate cause. "IT]he plaintiff's negligence
is an intervening or insulating cause, between the defendant's negligence
and the result." It is said that the plaintiff's act, and not the defendant's,
is the cause of the injury. In malpractice cases, the injury complained of is
that inflicted by a doctor who has breached a duty owed to his patient while
treating him. As to that injury, the plaintiff's prior activities cannot be
said to be a proximate cause. It would not seem to be foreseeable that one
who suffers a physical injury through his own negligence will suffer further
injury due to improper care received at the hands of the physician selected
to treat the initial injury.
Another element of contributory negligence, closely related to proximate cause, is the concept of particular risk. Contributory negligence bars
recovery only when the injury is caused by the risk or hazard to which the
plaintiff's negligent conduct exposes him. 7 Unless the plaintiff's negligent
conduct exposes him to the foreseeable risk of a particular injury which is
caused by the malpractice of his doctor, that conduct will not bar the action. The risk one is exposed to by disregarding a lowered railroad crossing
gate is that of being struck by a train, not the risk of tripping over improperly laid railss and not the risk of suffering further injury through the malpractice of a physician.
It might be argued that negligence in selecting a physician would be
conduct prior to treatment which could constitute contributory negligence
4 For a discussion as to what kind of conduct has been held to constitute contributory
negligence, see Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 1043 (1956). Some of the acts mentioned are (a) failure
to return for further treatment, (b) not following instructions, (c) refusal of suggested
treatment, (d) failure to consult another physician when dissatisfied with treatment being
received, and (e) ordering the doctor to treat in a manner which he does not recommend.
5 Contributory negligence may no longer be a complete defense to a malpractice action
in Illinois. In a recent appellate court case, the doctrine of comparative negligence has
apparently been adopted. If the Supreme Court of Illinois does not reverse that decision,
defense attorneys may be expected to place greater emphasis upon assumption of risk,
App. 2d 439, 229 N.E.2d
for it is a complete bar to recovery. See Maki v. Frelk, 85 I11.
284 (2d Dist. 1967).
8 Prosser, Torts § 64 (3d ed. 1964).
7 Ibid.
8 Prosser, Torts § 64 (3d ed. 1964); Hudson v. Lehigh Valley R.Co., 54 Pa. Super. 107
(1913). (Failure to stop, look and listen; struck by descending crossing gate.)
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and bar recovery.9 However, it is not the selection of an incompetent physician that causes an injury. It is the submission to treatment by one who is
incompetent or drunk 0 that is the efficient cause of the injury, and such
submission is contemporaneous with treatment rather than prior to it.
DURING TREATMENT

More commonly, it is the conduct of a patient during the course of
treatment which is pleaded as a bar to malpractice.
The leading case in Illinois on contributory negligence is Wesley v.
Allen." There, by way of a much cited dictum, the court said,
[I]f a patient is guilty of contributory negligence which is an
active and efficient contributing cause of the injury occasioned by
the malpractice of his physician he is not entitled to recover. In
other words, contributory negligence simultaneous and cooperating
with the fault of the physician and entering into creation of the
cause of action and forming an element in the transaction
which
12
constitutes the cause of action will bar a recovery.
Frequently the contributory negligence complained of is a failure to
cooperate with the physician. One of the earliest Illinois cases to rule that
a failure to cooperate would bar an action was Haering v. Spicer.1 3 In that
case, the defendant-doctor was called to treat the plaintiff two days after she
had been injured. Due to the inflamed and swollen condition of the plaintiff's injured shoulder and her resistance to the examination, it was difficult
to discover the extent of the injury. Only by use of a general anesthetic
could a more thorough examination have been made, and for that an assistant would have been required. The evidence conflicted as to whether
the defendant knew from the examination he did make that the plaintiff's
shoulder was dislocated. The evidence also conflicted as to whether the defendant requested that the patient's husband obtain an assistant for the
defendant-doctor. The appellate court reversed the trial court and held
that the jury should have been instructed that it is the duty of a patient to
follow all reasonable advice and, if the doctor requests needed assistance,
9 When one selects a physician whom he knows is incompetent, he is aware of the
danger and may be said to have voluntarily assumed the risk. In such cases, contributory
negligence and assumption of risk overlap. See Prosser, Torts § 67 (3d ed. 1964).
10 Champs v. Stone, 74 Ohio App. 334, 58 N.E. 803 (1944).
11 235 Ill. App. 322 (4th Dist. 1925). In Wesley v. Allen, the plaintiff, while in the
scope of his employment, injured his finger. He alleged that the defendant failed to
amputate it but instead carelessly dressed it. As a result, the finger became so badly
infected that plaintiff permanently lost the use of his right hand and arm. The court,
based its decision on the statute of limitations and an estoppel due to accepting as full
satisfaction of his injuries an award of $2856 under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Nevertheless, this case has been widely cited for the definition of contributory negligence.
See 26 I.L.P. Medicine and Surgery § 33 (1956), and 41 Am. Jur. Physicians and Surgeons

§ 80 (1942).
12 Supra note 11, at 324.
18 92 11. App. 449 (3d Dist. 1900).
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and the plaintiff refuses or neglects to procure it, the physician cannot be
held liable for an injury which would have been prevented had assistance
been procured.
14
Another early Illinois case of similar import is Littlejohn v. Arbogast.
In that case, the plaintiff suffered serious injuries to his back and hip due
to a fall. The defendant was called in to treat the injuries. The vital issue
to be decided was whether the defendant was negligent in failing to properly
treat the dislocated hip. The defendant contended that he knew of the dislocated hip, but did not immediately set it, for such action would have
seriously endangered the plaintiff's life, as the plaintiff was also suffering
from a dangerous spinal injury. After the plaintiff had somewhat recovered,
he refused to allow the defendant to administer the anesthetic necessary to
reduce the dislocation. The court, in reversing the trial court, held that the
patient was under a duty to submit to the necessary treatment prescribed
by his physician and, when he refused, the physician could not be held
liable for injuries flowing from his failure to administer the refused
treatment.

In both of these cases, the plaintiff suffiered injury due to improper
treatment being rendered. However, in both cases, the plaintiff was the
cause of the treatment being improper. It was the patient's failure to cooperate with the doctor that caused the injury and prevented the doctor
from performing acts which would have resulted in no injury being done.
Though the courts tend to speak in terms of "treatment," the time
which is important when dealing with contributory negligence is much
narrower in scope. The controlling moment is that moment which coincides with the physician's negligent act. In the Wesley case, the court's
language does relate to that instant. The words "simultaneous and cooperating with the fault of the physician and entering into creation of the cause
of action and forming an element in the transaction which constitutes the
cause of action will bar a recovery"' 5 can have no other meaning.
In deciding the Wesley case, the Illinois court cited a West Virginia
decision, Jenkins v. Charleston Gen. Hosp. and Training School,16 as persuasive authority. There, the plaintiff went to the hospital for X-rays of his
broken arm. Before the plates were developed, the plaintiff left. He later
received by mail a letter saying that the splints would not have to be removed. However the hospital radiologist had not properly X-rayed the arm
and thus the letter informing the plaintiff that his arm would not have to
be reset was incorrect. The plaintiff's own doctor removed the splints two
weeks later and saw that the arm was crooked. He advised the plaintiff to
return to the hospital. The plaintiff's failure to follow this advice resulted
14 95 111. App. 605 (3d Dist. 1900).

15 Supra note 12.
16 90 W.Va. 230, 110 S.E. 560 (1922).
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in permanent injury to his arm. The defendant hospital charged that in
not returning to the hospital after being advised to do so by his own physician the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which barred recovery. The court disagreed with this contention and said that the contributory negligence which bars recovery must be contemporaneous with the
main fact charged as negligence, and that negligence of a plaintiff which occurs subsequent to the defendant's negligence though still during the course
of treatment, merely mitigates damages. If the plaintiff has negligently
done something to contribute to his own injury, but can show what amount
of injury is attributable to defendant's lack of care, he may recover to that
extent.
These cases suggest that though the plaintiff may be negligent during
the course of treatment, he may still recover if his negligent acts occur subsequent to the negilgence of the defendant. The important moment in time
is the time during which the medical practitioner performs the act that is
alleged to be negligent. If some negligent act of the patient has an adverse
effect on the physician's treatment at the time he administers that treatment, and, if not for the patient's acts, the injury complained of would not
have occurred, then the cause of action may be defeated by the defense of
contributory negligence.
AFTER TREATMENT

As previously mentioned, though courts frequently speak in terms of
treatment rather than specific acts, it is clear that the important instant is
that when the acts complained of occur. For that reason, negligence of the
plaintiff during and after treatment, but subsequent to the negligence of
the physician, will be herein discussed.
In general, an injured person is under a duty to mitigate his damages.'?
This duty is bound up in the rule of avoidable consequences. The rule of
avoidable consequences operates on the negligence of a plaintiff which takes
place subsequent' s to the legal wrong that has occurred, but while some
damages can still be averted. Subsequent negligence operates to aggravate
the injury already done, and the rule of avoidable consequences bars recovery of those damages that could have been avoided had the plaintiff
adhered to the standard of the reasonable man.' 9
The decisions in Illinois follow this line of reasoning. The court, by
way of a dictum in Wesley v. Allen, summed up the rule most adequately:
17 Devlin v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 210 I1. App. 7 (1st Dist. 1918).
18 The problem raised when the plaintiff's neglect is contemporaneous with or prior

to the defendant's and contributes to the extent of the injury sustained, though not to
the cause, is more difficult to resolve. Decisions are split as to whether the plaintiff should
recover for the entire injury sustained, or only for those injuries not flowing from his
own acts. In either case, however, the plaintiff does recover something. See Prosser, Torts
§ 64 (3d ed. 1964).
19 Prosser, Torts § 64 (3d ed. 1964).
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Where the negligence of the patient is subsequent to the malpractice and merely aggravates the injury inflicted by the physician, it only affects the amount of the damages recoverable by the
patient. Such negligence will simply prevent a recovery to the extent that the damages were thereby enhanced or increased. 20
It has been held in Illinois and other jurisdictions that the plaintiff is
under a duty to follow the reasonable directions of his doctor, and, in the
absence of directions, he is required to exercise the ordinary care of a reasonable man in a like situation. 2x If he does not, and this conduct is subsequent to any negligence of his physician, there will be no compensation
recovered to the extent that this conduct aggravates the injury initially
caused by the physician. Subsequent negligence on the part of the patient
does not discharge the doctor's liability, but it does mitigate the damages. 22
However, the case of Morris v. Despain2s illustrates that not every
failure to follow a doctor's instructions results in a mitigation of damages.
In that case, Mrs. Despain suffered a fracture of her left femur. The leg
was improperly set so that the knee was turned inward 30 to 90 degrees and
the leg rendered useless. Mrs. Despain refused to allow the defendant to
rebreak and reset the leg. She was 69 years old at the time and such a procedure might have endangered her life. The court held that though plaintiff24 is under a duty to mitigate damages, the law does not require her to
risk her life. Thus, though the damages caused by the doctor's negligent
treatment could have been reduced, the court affirmed the trial court, which
had instructed the jury that in this case Mrs. Despain's refusal of further
treatment was not to be considered in determining the defendant's liability
or in assessing damages. The appellate court said that a defendant need
not risk her life before the law would allow her to sustain a claim for
damages.
CONCLUSION

Though plaintiff may be charged with negligent conduct that occurred
before, during, or after treatment, only that conduct which occurs simultaneously with the alleged misconduct of defendant will serve to completely
322 (4th Dist. 1925).
21 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 51, 67 (1951); 41 Am. Jur. Physicians and
Surgeons § 80 (1942). For Illinois cases not specifically dealing with medical malpractice,
but concerning mitigation of damages in general, see 11 Ill. Digest, Damages § 62 (1939).
22 Doyle v. Owen, 150 11. App. 415 (2d Dist. 1909).
23 104 Ill. App. 452 (2d Dist. 1902).
24 The discussion in this article has been limited to the patient as the allegedly negligent plaintiff. However, there is case law to the effect that the negligence of a minor's
parents in caring for and nursing such child is to be regarded as the negligence of the
child. See Sanderson v. Holland, 39 Mo. App. 233 (1889). Contra, Wheatley v. Heideman,
251 Iowa 695, 102 N.W.2d 343 (1960); Nelson v. Harrington, 72 Wis. 591, 40 N.W. 228
(1888). The case of Haering v. Spicer, 92 111. App. 449 (3d Dist. 1900), suggests that the
negligence of those having charge of the patient may be imputed to the patient in bar
of an action for malpractice. The evidence introduced by the appellant physician tended
to show that he requested the patient's husband to procure an assistant for the doctor.
This was held to be such contributory negilgence as to defeat the suit for malpractice.
20 235 I1. App.
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discharge defendant of his liability. Negligence which occurs prior to the
defendant's negligence is of no effect at all. Negligence which occurs subsequent to the defendant's negligence can only serve to mitigate damages.
MERRILL C.

HoYT

ASSUMPTION OF RISK AS A DEFENSE IN MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION
William Prosser, in his treatise on Torts,' discusses three situations
that give rise to the defense of assumption of risk. The first occurs when
the plaintiff has expressly given his consent to relieve defendant from a
duty and has decided to take his chances of injury from a known risk. The
second occurs when the plaintiff, with knowledge of the risk, voluntarily
enters into some relation with the defendant which will probably result in
encountering the known danger. The third situation exists when the plaintiff becomes aware of a risk already created by the negligence of the defendant and elects to continue in the face of the danger.
All three require that the plaintiff has knowledge of the danger that
is to be encountered and voluntarily elects to meet it. If the plaintiff's decision to take the risk is in itself unreasonable, below the standard of the
reasonable man, the conduct is a form of contributory negligence. Due to
this overlap, many courts fail to distinguish between contributory negli2
gence and assumption of risk.
The difficulty in applying assumption of risk to cases of medical malpractice is that plaintiff must be shown to have had knowledge of the risk
assumed and to have voluntarily chosen to meet that risk. Proving these
two elements is difficult at best. A patient may be aware of the dangers inherent in various medical procedures, but he rarely has any real choice in
selecting the treatment given. When he is offered alternatives, both being
thoroughly explained, the charge of negligence is most often grounded in
an improper execution of the technique or procedure selected, rather than
in an improper selection of the technique or procedure utilized.
Another factor, peculiar to cases of surgery and emergency treatment,
which makes assumption of risk inapplicable is the usual unconsciousness
of the patient at the time of the alleged negligence of the physician. A
patient who has neither control over what is being done, nor awareness of
the physician's activities, cannot be said to have had knowledge of the risk
assumed coupled with a voluntary election to meet it. However, under such
circumstances, it would be equally difficult to prove contributory negligence.
I Prosser, Torts § 67 (3d ed. 1964).
2 Ibid.

